War-Winning Coalitions
University of Texas - Austin
Abstract:
War-winning coalitions face a unique problem of ensuring credible commitments to the distribution of spoils and collective defense of the postwar status quo. Some sustain cooperation for years or decades, yet others collapse much sooner into intramural violence. Why do some victorious coalitions collapse into war, while others do not? To answer this question, I analyze data on war-winning coalitions from 1815 to 2007, modeling the duration of post-victory peace between their members in an event history framework. Increasing coalition size is associated with less durable postwar peace, while increasing prewar alliance commitments are associated with less durable peace and great power participation are associated with more durable peace. These results have implications for the survival of postwar settlements, the role of alliances and great powers in world order, and testing theories of war in general.
Discussants:
Daina Chiba, University of Essex
Amy Yuen, Middlebury College
Michaela Mattes, University of California - Berkeley
David Carter, Princeton University
OPSC Coordinator: Emily Ritter, University of California - Merced
Graduate Assistant:
Peter D. Carey II (University of California Merced)
