Foreign Aid & Transnational Terrorism
University of Texas - Austin
Abstract:
How can the efficacy of foreign aid as a tool of counterterrorism policy be augmented? Foreign aid is a prominent strategy in the fight against transnational terrorism, however its effectiveness at reducing transnational terror attacks is undercut by misappropriation by aid recipients. This paper argues that international counterterrorism agreements increase the ability of donors to monitor aid recipients, making threats to withdraw aid if it is misappropriated more credible and consequently inducing states to invest foreign aid in ways that reduce transnational terrorism. I test empirical implications of the theory for patterns of aid allocation and transnational attacks using data on counterterrorism agreement ratification, foreign aid, and transnational terrorism. I find that states which ratify agreements receive more foreign aid, and that aid is marginally more effective at reducing transnational terrorism in states which ratify. In conclusion, I discuss the implications of this paper for the literature on international institutions as vehicles of information transmission and the relationship between capacity building and enforcement in international institutions.
Discussants:
Matthew DiGiuseppe, University of Mississippi
Benjamin Fordham, Binghamton University
Carla Martinez Machain, Kansas State University
Burcu Savun, University of Pittsburgh
OPSC Coordinator: Emily Ritter, University of California - Merced
Graduate Assistant:
Peter D. Carey II (University of California Merced)
