Is Civilian Control Self-Reinforcing? A Measurement Based Analysis of Civil-Military Relations

"Is Civilian Control Self-Reinforcing? A Measurement Based Analysis of Civil-Military Relations"

Michael Kenwick, PhD Candidate

Pennsylvania State University

Abstract:

Asserting control over the military is a fundamental characteristic of any stable civilian regime. While scholars have long held that a norm of subjugation within the armed forces is critical to civilian rule, there is little empirical evidence that directly supports this claim. This is driven, in part, by a dearth of valid cross-sectional measures of civilian control across political regimes. Here, I argue that developing a norm of subjugation depends critically on a shared belief among military elites that coups and interventions into politics are untenable policy options. These beliefs develop slowly over time and as the result of stable periods of civil-military bargaining. I test these claims by using latent variable modeling techniques to generate continuous, yearly estimates of civilian control for all countries from 1946 to 2010. I incorporate the presence of norms through a dynamic modeling structure and find that doing so significantly improves model performance, supporting my theoretical expectations.

Discussants:

Clayton Thyne, University of Kentucky

Jonathan Powell, University of Central Florida

Andrew Little, Cornell University

OPSC Coordinator:

Emily Ritter, University of California Merced

Graduate Assistant:

Peter D. Carey II (University of California Merced)