How Does International Intervention Work? Mechanisms for Securing Peace in Civil Conflicts
Aila Matanock - University of California Berkeley
Adam Lichtenheld - University of California Berkeley
Abstract:
There is emerging consensus that international intervention can secure peace by helping combatants overcome commitment problems following civil wars. But how do interveners accomplish this? Recent studies suggest that intervention primarily works through coercion. We theorize an alternative mechanism: monitoring and conditioning incentives on compliance with peace processes. Despite a rich literature on intervention, little effort has been made to systematically identify and test the mechanisms. This paper takes a first step toward this end, using cross-national data on United Nations peacekeeping and case evidence on El Salvador. Contrary to common wisdom, our analysis suggests that coercion is neither frequently employed nor necessary to overcome commitment problems, particularly in post-conflict settings. Conditional incentives are effective in prolonging peace, even when controlling for potential selection effects. This research has important implications for external efforts to secure peace in civil conflicts worldwide.
Discussants:
Andrew Kydd - University of Wisconsin Madison
Sarah von Billerbeck - University of Reading
Megan Shannon - University of Colorado Boulder
Paul Diehl - University of Texas Dallas
OPSC Coordinator:
Emily Ritter - University of California Merced
Graduate Assistant:
Peter D. Carey II (University of California Merced)
