Civil Wars of Attrition: Bargaining, Reputation, and Conflict Duration

"Civil Wars of Attrition: Bargaining, Reputation, and Conflict Duration"

Casey Crisman-Cox

Washington University in St. Louis

Abstract:

I estimate each side’s reputation for resolve in civil wars by deriving a strategic statistical duration model from a continuous-time bargaining and reputation game. I find that governments, on average, have stronger reputations for resolve; they are more likely than rebels to be an intransigent type that refuses to negotiate. The longest wars occur when beliefs about the government are only slightly larger than beliefs about the rebels. In these cases, governments are defending their reputation for resolve against a rebel group trying to demonstrate their own resolve. When the gap is too large, the disadvantaged player concedes quickly, and when the gap is too small, governments are less willing to fight because the rebels are clearly capable. If neither side has a strong reputation, war is (expectedly) short, but rebels win over 80% of these short encounters.

Discussants:

Scott Wolford (University of Texas Austin)

Benjamin Jones (University of Mississippi)

Jacqueline Sievert (Bowling Green State University)

Jonathan Renshon (University of Wisconsin Madison)

OPSC Coordinator:

Emily Hencken Ritter (University of California Merced)

Graduate Assistant:

Peter D. Carey II (University of California Merced)