Culpability and Leadership Change During Civil War: When Militaries Oust Not Only Leaders But Also T
Jun Koga Sudduth
University of Strathclyde
Abstract:
Why are some state leaders overthrown by their own militaries during civil war, while others are not? In particular, why are some war-time state leaders removed via regime-change coups such that not only individual leaders but the entire regime itself is overthrown by militaries, while other war-time leaders lose power via reshuffling coups in which militaries and other ruling elites replace individual leaders but keep the regime intact? I claim that whether a leader is considered culpable for the initiation of the war is the key explanation for variations in the manner of leadership changes during war. In contrast to the literature, I argue that leader culpability does not affect leader punishment itself, but has an important implication for the manner of leader punishment during war. Empirical evidence supports my hypotheses: (i) culpable leaders are more likely to be removed in regime-change coups during civil war, but not in reshuffling coups, as the cost of war for the government side increases, while (ii) nonculpable leaders are more likely to be removed via reshuffling coups, but not via regime-change coups, as the cost of war increases. The findings challenge and improve the literature's views on how leader culpability determines leader punishment in the context of wars.
Discussants:
Thomas E. Flores (George Mason University)
Joseph Wright (Pennsylvania State University)
Sarah Croco (University of Maryland)
Jack Paine (University of Rochester)
OPSC Coordinator:
Emily Hencken Ritter (University of California Merced)
Graduate Assistant:
Peter D. Carey II (University of California Merced)
