Leaders, Interstate Conflict, and Spatial Interdependence
Jeff Carter
The University of Mississippi
Abstract:
I argue that spatial interdependence exists in the observation of hawkish and dovish political
leaders. This is due to two factors. First, hawks represent a national security threat to nearby
states because they are more likely to initiate interstate conflicts than are doves. Second,
individuals prefer hawkish politicians and more aggressive policies when they feel threatened by an external actor. Taken together, these observations suggest hawkish leaders and dovish leaders should diffuse and cluster across space and over time. I assess this claim using a spatial regression model on a sample of 137 countries during the period between 1960 and 1999. Consistent with expectations, I find that having a relatively hawkish leader or a relatively dovish leader results in geographically proximate states having relatively more hawkish leaders or dovish leaders. My results suggest that the diffusion and clustering of interstate conflicts in time and space are at least partially driven by the diffusion and clustering of hawks and doves.
Discussants:
Olga Chyzh (Iowa State University)
Alex Braithwaite (University of Arizona)
Shana Gadarian (Syracuse University)
Scott Wolford (University of Texas at Austin)
OPSC Coordinator:
Emily Hencken Ritter (Vanderbilt University)
Graduate Assistant:
Heesun Yoo (Vanderbilt University)
