Explaining the Design and Implementation of Civil War Peace Agreements
Deniz Cil
University of Maryland College Park
Alyssa Prorok
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Abstract:
This paper examines variation in the design of civil war settlement agreements. It argues that constituents, fighters, and rebel elites have different preferences over the terms of peace, and that rebel leaders will push for settlements that reflect the preferences of whichever audience they are most reliant upon and accountable to. In particular, leaders of groups that are more civilian-reliant for their military and political power are more likely to sign agreements that favor broad benefits for civilian constituents, while leaders who do not depend upon strong civilian support for their political and military power will sign agreements with fewer public benefits. We test this argument using original data on the design of 80 final peace agreements reached between 1989 and 2009, and several proxies for the group’s level of reliance upon civilian supporters. Using a variety of statistical tests and accounting for non-random selection into peace agreements, we find strong support for most of our hypotheses.
Discussants:
Carla Martinez Machain (Kansas State University)
Gary Uzonyi (University of Tennessee)
Mike Findley (University of Texas at Austin)
Lindsay Reid (University of California Davis)
OPSC Coordinator:
Emily Hencken Ritter (Vanderbilt University)
Graduate Assistant:
Heesun Yoo (Vanderbilt University)
