Border Control and Insurgent Tactics

"Border Control and Insurgent Tactics"

Christopher W. Blair

University of Pennsylvania

Abstract:

Where cross-border sanctuary enables rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border control. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational rebels’ resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. While little existing work tests this conventional wisdom, its prescriptions resonate with policymakers. Counterinsurgent border control is increasingly common. Building on theories linking resources and technologies of rebellion, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in border control strategies. Well-resourced rebels with external support can afford conventional attacks and indiscriminate violence. However, when counterinsurgent border control efforts interdict foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more guerrilla attacks and reduced civilian victimization. Ultimately, counterinsurgent border control efforts tradeoff reduced insurgent capabilities for greater competition over local hearts-and-minds. I illustrate this theory with archival evidence from the Algerian War of Independence, and test it using declassified microdata on border fortification, violence, and insurgent smuggling networks in Iraq. A difference-in-differences design leveraging temporal and spatial variation in border fortification shows that U.S.-led border fortification efforts caused insurgents to substitute conventional for guerrilla tactics, and to reduce civilian victimization.