Do States Screen or Signal?

"Do States Screen or Signal?"

Noam Reich (Princeton University)

Abstract:

"Canonical models of crisis bargaining maintain that states convey resolve by investing in costly signals. However, I argue that resolved states have the most to gain by going to war and are therefore the least willing to devote resources to settling a dispute peacefully. As an alternative to signaling, I demonstrate that negotiations can

function as a screening process. I model diplomacy as a war of attrition where states must choose how long to negotiate before conceding or going to war. States can prolong negotiations in the hope that their rival will concede. I show that when delay is costly, more resolved states, who have less to gain from a concession, go to war sooner. This threat of war causes unresolved states, who stand to lose the most from fighting, to concede faster. States can then glean information about their rival’s resolve from their choice to continue negotiating or not."

Discussants:

Mark Fey (Rochester University)

Peter Schram (Vanderbilt University)

Jessica Sun (Emory University)

OSPC Coordinator:

Brad Smith (Vanderbilt University).